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What is Enshrined in Morality?: 
Understanding the Grounds for Nietzsche’s Critique!!
“Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, !
the value of these values themselves must first be called into question..."
-Nietzsche, GM: “Preface,” 6!
I. Introduction!
! It is a truism—albeit one requiring two sets of scare quotes—that Nietzsche, the 
self-styled “immoralist,” (Cf., EH, “Destiny,” 4) is a critic of “morality.”  But what does this 
amount to?  I begin by being more specific about the form of “morality” that he takes as his 
target. As is now often held in the secondary literature on Nietzsche, he is not, in his 
opposition to morality, against the very idea of norms and values as such. Rather, he is 
critical of a broad sociological phenomenon—a family of normative views that arise, and 
become dominant, over the past couple millennia in the West. I then turn to the main 
question of the paper: What does Nietzsche have against this morality? What, in particular, 
are his grounds for objecting to it? !
! A prominent interpretation has it that Nietzsche takes morality to task for its bad 
eﬀects on the realization of the sort of perfectionistic values he cares most about. 
Specifically, its pernicious influence is thought to hamper the flourishing of great 
individuals.  This is certainly one of Nietzsche’s recurring complaints about morality. But 1
there are good reasons, I argue, to resist this reading as the best, and certainly as the 
exclusive, account of the grounds for Nietzsche’s criticism of morality. I then go on to 
propose an alternative construal. This interpretation sees Nietzsche’s objection to morality 
as rooted not simply or even primarily in its bad eﬀects, but in what, for lack of a better 
word, might be described as the intrinsically objectionable expressive character of the 
 A notable representative of this view is Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (Routledge, 2002), 127 ﬀ.1
institution of morality, and of moral values themselves. (This notion of “expressive 
character” is one I will be clarifying in due course.) It is not just that morality has eﬀects 
that are objectionable. It is that it enshrines ideals that are themselves objectionable. Just to 
get the structure of the objection, and abstracting from Nietzsche, compare the following 
two sorts of broadly ethical criticism: The sociological phenomenon of racial segregation 
has bad eﬀects; but it also enshrines ideals that are themselves intrinsically objectionable, 
regardless of their eﬀects.!
! In taking the lynchpin of Nietzsche’s criticism to be something other than morality’s 
eﬀects, the reading I propose better represents Nietzsche’s complex attitude toward the 
wide range of eﬀects—both negative and positive—that he sees morality as engendering. It 
also makes better sense of Nietzsche’s apparent doubts that the truly great could ever be 
stymied by morality. Moreover, and most importantly, it allows for the idea that morality, as 
a normative institution, is deeply objectionable, in such a way that its objectionable 
character outstrips its objectionable eﬀects.!
! Yet I should be clear at the outset that I do not seek to vindicate Nietzsche’s 
criticism of morality as straightforwardly correct. Some of his barbed arrows find their 
target. But much of what he says in his criticism of morality is, at the very least, highly 
tendentious, and we would do well to treat it with considerable caution, if not outright 
skepticism. This is not, however, to suggest that his remarks on this topic—insofar as they 
fail to level decisive charges against the institution of morality or to have wide-ranging 
implications for what we today ought to do—are to be confined to the realm of purely 
exegetical interest. There are important philosophical lessons to be learned here from 
Nietzsche’s work, if not always about the actual failings of morality itself then about the 
kinds of ethical and ideological objections that philosophers and cultural critics can sensibly 
raise. One of the central styles of critique that we see in Nietzsche’s work, exemplified 
especially in his criticism of morality, involves interpreting social and cultural phenomena, as 
one might interpret texts or works of art, with an eye toward extracting the meaning or 
significance they have in light of the ideals that they enshrine, and then attacking them, on 
broadly ethical grounds, on account of this. It thereby creates the space for criticizing 
institutions not just for what pernicious eﬀects they have, but for the intrinsically 
objectionable character of what they express. !
! In the wake of Nietzsche, and to some degree under his influence, this form of 
criticism became prominent in the 20th century, particularly in the work of the Frankfurt 
School. In a far less critical vein, it has certain historical antecedents in the approach of 
Hegel, in seeing various self-understandings and self-misunderstandings of Geist manifested 
in a range of phenomena throughout human history. One sees echoes of it in ordinary 
ethical discourse. While I do not wish to make any ambitious historical hypotheses about 
whether, in its stingingly reprobative form, this type of ethical criticism originates with 
Nietzsche, he is certainly of its most distinctive, adroit, and interesting practitioners. And, 
as a style of ethical and social criticism, it is worthy of our philosophical attention, whatever 
our attitude toward the success of Nietzsche’s application of it in his critique of the 
institution of morality itself. !
!
II. The Historical Institution of Morality!
! Nietzsche uses the term “morality” in a way that is less than precise, as was his wont.  2
At a few points in his work, he uses it quite broadly to mean any system of non-prudential 
normative guidance about how one should conduct one’s life and one’s relations with 
others.  But more often, he uses the term “morality” more narrowly as the name for a 3
particular family of views that rise in social prominence during the long span of time 
between the birth of Christianity and the fall of the Roman Empire.  It is the latter sense 4
that is at issue when Nietzsche conceives of morality as something that comes into being at 
a particular time in history and stands in need of a critique. !
! But what is this thing morality? Given its protean character, it resists a neat 
definition. Although in its archetypal form this morality is intimately bound up with the 
tenets of the Christian religion, it branches and persists in various secularized inheritors. 
 Nietzsche’s most frequent term is “Moral.” He also uses “Moralität,” and occasionally (e.g., D, 103) 2
“Sittlichkeit.” The last can be confusing because Nietzsche distinguishes morality (in one sense of the term) 
from the pre-moral system of customs, which he calls the “morality of custom” [Sittlichkeit der Sitte] (GM, II:2; 
D, 9).
 Nietzsche, for example, writes: “Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality–in other words, as we 3
understand it, merely one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other 
types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible” (BGE, 202). Here he would appear to be using 
“morality” in two senses at once, in a narrower sense when he refers to it as the morality that holds sway in 
Europe, in a broader sense when he refers to it as just one type of human morality among others. The narrower 
sense is far more frequent in Nietzsche’s work, and that is how I will use the term “morality” here. (Yet, as we 
shall see, to say even of this narrower sense that it is “one” type of morality can also be a misleadingly 
imprecise locution, because it suggests a unity that this morality lacks.) When Nietzsche uses the term in the 
narrower sense, his use is in some ways similar to that of Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
(Harvard, 1985)–—no doubt himself inspired by Nietzsche–—who takes morality to be a historically-
contingent “system” and a “peculiar institution.” Rather than seeing morality and ethics as one and the same, 
Williams sees morality as one branch of ethics. Nietzsche does not systematically draw this distinction himself 
in his terminology, though something like it is implicitly there, in the distinction between morality in the 
narrower sense and morality in the broader sense that we find in BGE, 202. This ethics/morality divide in 
Nietzsche’s work is the guiding theme of Simon May, Nietzsche’s Ethics and His War on ‘Morality’  (Oxford, 1999). 
See also Maudemarie Clark, “On the Rejection of Morality: Nietzsche’s Debt to Bernard Williams,” in 
Nietzsche’s Postmoralism, ed. Richard Schacht, (Cambridge, 2002). 
 There are the stirrings of this new morality system in the ethical views of Socrates and Plato. But at least 4
according to Nietzsche’s central historical argument in the First Essay of the Genealogy, the birth of the 
morality system is coterminous with the rise of Christianity. Christianity of course doesn’t develop in a 
vacuum; it draws on this Platonic heritage, and appeals to the masses as a kind of “Platonism for ‘the 
people.’” (BGE, “Preface”).
Kantian ethics and Benthamite utilitarianism, as far apart as they are, are both, in 
Nietzsche’s eyes, parts of this same morality family. It might then be more apt to describe 
“morality,” even in the narrower sense that picks out an historical entity, as a collection of 
loosely-related worldviews (or “moralities” in the plural) rather than what we might think of 
as a rigorous and consistent first-order normative system.  !5
! Moreover, it is important to see that these moralities, as Nietzsche understands 
them, are not just a series of rules to be obeyed, but are a constellation of related ideals, 
values, and so on—in short, a whole outlook on life—as Christianity or secular liberal 
humanism are. (Of Christianity, for example, Nietzsche writes that it is “the most prodigal 
elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected” (BT, “Attempt,” 
5)). At the most general level, these moralities that comprise morality (in the historical 
sense) will typically include some or all of the following:!
!
(1) norms, which prescribe things and proscribe others;!
(2) a meta-norm, according to which its norms are universal in scope and overriding in 
importance;!
 For a characterization of what commitments Nietzsche takes this value “system,” hodgepodge that it is, to 5
involve, see Maudemarie Clark, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality,: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley, 1994). Leiter (2002), Chs. 3 
and 4, and Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Morality,” in his Morality, Culture, and History (Cambridge, 1999). 
Both Leiter (p. 77) and Geuss (p. 167) rightly stress Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism about morality, and Clark (p. 
31) similarly stresses the fact that it is a synthesis of disparate historical strands. . It should not be viewed as a 
failing on Nietzsche’s part that he does not define the morality he is attacking precisely. He does not think it is 
the sort of phenomenon that can or should be defined precisely. On this latter point, see GM, II:13, where 
Nietzsche writes, “...all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only 
that which has no history is definable.” 
(3) valuations and assessments (e.g., that the suﬀering of sentient creatures is bad, that 
all human beings are of equal worth and dignity, that people deserve to be punished for the 
wrongs they “freely” do; that the only thing unqualifiedly good is “the good will”); !
(4) ideals informed by these valuations about what sort of lives are most worth leading (e.g., 
to live a life that is as free as possible of suﬀering, to live a life of saintly abnegation, or to 
live a life of devoted altruism);  !6
(5) associated descriptive beliefs (e.g., that human beings have free will in a 
metaphysically strong sense; that the human soul is immortal). !
!
! But, as the varied parenthetical examples I have just given will suggest, when we get 
to the substantive commitments among various branches of this unruly thing “morality,” it 
can be diﬃcult to find much agreement. Consider the deontological moral norms suggested 
by Kant as opposed to the utilitarian ones oﬀered by Bentham, or think of the tremendous 
importance of pity in Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy in contrast to its relative lack of 
importance in Kant’s. Morality, if taken to be a unitary thing, would seem to be rife with 
internecine disagreement. But the singularity of the term “morality” is especially misleading 
here. I’ll continue to use the term “morality” in the singular, as Nietzsche most often does, 
but we must bear in mind that this term, even in its narrower sense, is meant to capture the 
moral thinking of philosophers as diﬀerent as Kant, John Stuart Mill, and St. Augustine. !
 There may not be a hard-and-fast line between “norms” and “ideals.” One way of drawing the line would be to 6
see “ideals” as hortatory, but not as mandatory. But then again, there are probably some norms by which 
certain things are “strongly discouraged” rather than outright impermissible or by which some actions are 
“above and beyond the call of duty” (i.e., supererogatory) rather than mandatory. 
! It can seem very odd that Nietzsche lumps these together under one term, since it is 
diﬃcult to see what unites them.  He does, as I have suggested, take them to share a 7
common ancestry. But even if true, this ambitious sociological claim does little to help us 
pick out the contours of this concept “morality.” The best way to cast a net over Nietzsche’s 
rather diﬀuse target “morality” is to notice the paradigmatic philosophical moralizers at 
whom Nietzsche levels criticism. The main targets are: !
!
1) Kant (BGE, 187; A, 11-12);!
2) Christians, e.g., St. Paul or Thomas Aquinas (A, 42; GM, I:15); !
3) Utilitarians, e.g. Bentham and Mill (BGE, 44; TI, “Maxims,” 12;);!
4) Schopenhauer (BGE, 186; GM, “Preface,” 5; A, 7);!
5) Socrates and Plato (BGE, “Preface”; BGE, 190; TI, “Socrates”); !8
6) “Enlightened” “secular” progressives, e.g. George Eliot (TI, “Skirmishes,” 5).!
!
As our loose working understanding of “morality,” in Nietzsche’s sense, we might then say 
that it is a family of worldviews, oﬀering themselves as guides to what is valuable and to how 
human life must be conducted, which are in the spirit of the moral thought of one or more 
of these figures. As should be clear from what I have said so far, there is no unified thing 
 One idea, proposed in Alexander Prescott-Couch, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Historical Individuals,” 7
International Studies in Philosophy (forthcoming) is that morality is not a functional kind, but rather an historical 
individual. While I strongly agree that morality is an historical kind of some sort, I prefer to think of morality 
as analogous to the family as opposed to the individual for the reasons I outline above. 
 As I’ve already mentioned, there is a tension here with Nietzsche’s own account of when morality began. The 8
best way to resolve this tension, in keeping with his terminology, is to see Socrates and Plato as proto-
moralists, who retrospectively become part of the moral tradition because of what their views lead to with 
Christianity and its secular oﬀspring (BGE, “Preface”). Nietzsche is loose enough with his terminology that it 
is not worthwhile for us to spend too long trying to figure out whether Socrates and Plato “really” belong to 
the moral or proto-moral tradition. 
“morality” that is the conjunction of these views. Excepting some moral philosophers whose 
intuitions have been brought into line with their own theories, the “commonsensical” 
morality that a given person endorses in late 19th century Europe (or today, for that matter) 
is likely not going to be a doctrinaire version of any one of these. It is instead likely going to 
be a hodgepodge of disparate, perhaps internally inconsistent strands, drawn from these 
diﬀerent moral traditions we have inherited. Now I would like to turn to the question of 
why Nietzsche attacks this morality. !
!
III. The Eﬀects Interpretation!
! I shall begin by considering an interpretation that we might call the Eﬀects 
Interpretation. The Eﬀects Interpretation construes Nietzsche’s attack as focused on the 
eﬀects of morality on the realization of the perfectionistic values Nietzsche cares about. On 
one key interpretation in this vein, oﬀered by Brian Leiter, Nietzsche is taken as holding 
that morality is problematic because of a “causal mechanism of harm.”  This reading 9
attributes to Nietzsche an empirical claim about the eﬀects of morality on human 
excellence and creative achievement. Living in accordance with morality, or more indirectly, 
living in a culture suﬀused with the attitudes characteristic of morality, “will have the eﬀect 
of leading potentially excellent persons to value what is in fact not conducive to their 
flourishing and to devalue what is, in fact, essential to it.”  !10
! Yet does Nietzsche think morality is bad simply, or even primarily, because of its bad 
eﬀects? No, I will be arguing here. In this section, I want to develop the most plausible 
 Leiter (2002), p. 127 ﬀ.9
 Leiter (2002), p. 133. 10
version of the Eﬀects Interpretation and then to raise some challenges for it. These are not, 
by any means, meant to be decisive objections to it. I do, however, want to emphasize that 
morality’s eﬀects are considerably more of a mixed bag than the Eﬀects Interpretation can 
make it seem. It is far from clear whether things would have been better, from the 
standpoint of the perfectionistic values associated with human excellence and cultural 
achievement, had this morality never arisen. It is as much a gift as a curse. Then in the 
section (IV) to follow, I will develop what I think is a more decisive objection to this Eﬀects 
Interpretation, at least insofar as it claims to be the exhaustive account of why Nietzsche is 
critical of morality. As I will argue in this section to come, a great deal of Nietzsche’s 
criticism of morality has nothing whatsoever to do with the eﬀects of morality; it is instead 
focused on the objectionable expressive character of the ideals, practices, and symbols of 
morality itself. !
! In order to assess the Eﬀects Interpretation in more detail, though, let us now 
consider how morality’s eﬀects might be thought to pose a threat to the flourishing of 
human excellence. The Eﬀects Interpretation is most plausible when it moves from a sole 
focus on explicit transgressions of morality as a necessary means to other beneficial ends 
(e.g., Gauguin abandoning his family in order to paint in Tahiti, in the famous example from 
Bernard Williams ) to a focus instead on more insidious threats. As Brian Leiter has argued, 11
the greatest risk from morality is not in the explicit prohibitions it sets up and the strictures 
created by having to live in accordance with these prohibitions. It is instead a matter of the 
attitudes that morality more subtly encourages, which run the risk of infecting great 
 Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981). 11
individuals.  Just to give one example: In a society in which pity is among the most lauded 12
moral attitudes, a potentially great artist might come to wallow in self-pity instead of 
exercising a sort of stoical “hammer-hardness” against himself and producing a masterpiece 
(BGE, 225). On Leiter’s own version of the view, those threatened by morality are a subclass 
marked oﬀ by certain fixed psycho-physical “type” characteristics.  The idea would be that 13
morality corrupts this particular type of person. One could, it bears noting, also have a 
version of the Eﬀects Interpretation without this typological commitment, holding that 
although Nietzschean “higher types” are not antecedently given in this way, a culture in 
which moral norms are dominant is one that will not be conducive to the formation of great 
individuals.  !14
! In any event, this family of interpretations, which I am including under the banner of 
the Eﬀects Interpretation, all would locate the problem with morality in its detrimental 
eﬀects. Morality demands, or else more subtly encourages, that an individual live in a certain 
way, or that social institutions be arranged in a certain “moral” and “just” way, yet in doing so 
morality imperils the flourishing of human greatness and threatens the possibility of cultural 
achievement. Now whether this “moral infection,” or “moral miasma” as it might be called, 
could ever undo a Nietzschean great individual, as at least Leiter’s version of the Eﬀects 
Interpretation would seem to assume, is a vexed matter that I shall treat later; given 
Nietzsche’s other commitments, there is reason to doubt whether Nietzsche, on such a 
typological view, should think that it in principle ever can. But we’ll try to work out that 
tension in due course. Let us accept for the time being the view, which Nietzsche often 
 Leiter (2002), p. 133.12
 Leiter (2002), p. 813
 I’m grateful to __________ for suggesting this possibility. 14
seems to endorse, that the morality system can thwart the flourishing of great individuals in 
ways more and less direct. Even if we accept this view, we will need to tread carefully. For 
the Eﬀects Interpretation, especially in the subtle form of it that is most plausible, cuts the 
other way as well. If we allow that the flourishing of great individuals can be imperiled in a 
world in which morality holds sway, then we should also allow, as Nietzsche himself does, 
that the flourishing of great individuals will benefit from a surrounding culture in which 
moral norms prevail. !
! As Nietzsche himself acknowledges, the priests’ invention of morality has had good 
eﬀects along with bad ones:!
!
...with the priests everything becomes more dangerous, not only cures and remedies, 
but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease–but 
it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human 
existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here 
did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil–and these are the 
two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts (GM, I:6).!
!
In terms of these consequences, it is a danger to greatness, but it is also a boon.  The story 15
that we get from Nietzsche, throughout GM II and III as well, is very much one of how 
much we owe to morality. Through the internalization of man, we get the bad conscience 
 In fact, the world is in key respects going downhill without Christianity. In a notebook entry entitled, “Man 15
owes the Christian Church,” Nietzsche writes: “it made the European spirit fine and supple through its 
‘intolerance.’ One sees right away, as is the case with freedom of the press in our democratic age, that thought 
becomes squat and dumpy.” (KSA, 11:450 [1885]).
and guilt, to be sure. But we also get the preconditions for an advanced form of autonomy.  16
Through the ascetic ideal, we get a devaluation of the earthly and a perverse overvaluation 
of truth. But this also forges in us a kind of particularly relentless truth-seeking, through 
which we come to ask uncomfortable questions about the history and value of the values we 
have inherited (GM, III:24). Both this advanced form of autonomy and this truth-seeking 
(BGE, 227) arguably are preconditions for and components of human excellence. !
! Or take Leiter’s own suggestion about the insidious eﬀects of morality on artistic 
creativity. Oﬀering a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s position, he argues that if 
great individuals come to think that suﬀering is a bad thing that needs to be alleviated, this 
will indirectly encourage them to become averse to suﬀering themselves. On Leiter’s 
reading, it is not so much that the great artist explicitly endorses this condemnation of all 
suﬀering whatsoever. After all, if the artist were thinking about things with such precision, 
he would likely distinguish prudentially worthwhile from wholly worthless suﬀering—and 
condemn only the latter. The problem is rather that the artist unconsciously absorbs this 
general aversion to suﬀering from his cultural milieu.  And since being willing to suﬀer is a 17
precondition of many great creative achievements, the influence of morality will have a 
stultifying eﬀect on creative accomplishment. !
! Suppose that this is right. Nonetheless, this negative eﬀect of morality is arguably 
counterbalanced by a positive one, produced by a countervailing cultural strand, which is 
indebted just as much to morality. And that is the tremendous glorification of suﬀering in at 
least one central branch of the morality family. Think of the passion of Christ; or the tale of 
 See Frederick Neuhouser, “Autonomy and Spiritual Illness” (forthcoming).16
 Leiter (2002), p. 133.17
Job, tested by God; or of the countless stories of saints—flayed, grilled, pelted with stones, 
pierced with arrows, and otherwise tortured for their beliefs. Christianity is a veritable cult 
of suﬀering; indeed the only people more Romantic than the Romantics in their celebration 
of suﬀering are Christians. Surely the calling is very diﬀerent for the Christian saint and the 
Nietzschean great individual. And granted, according to Christian doctrine, there is 
“redemption” for their suﬀering in heaven. Perhaps it is even right that the Christian would 
prefer a world in which there is no suﬀering at all.  But we are talking about the subtle and 18
indirect eﬀects of certain ideals. If morality, on the one hand, threatens artistic 
accomplishment by suggesting, via its Schopenhauerian and utilitarian strands, that a life 
free from suﬀering is the best life, likely it has had just as suggestive a power in the other 
direction via its Christian strand: suggesting that the life of tortured self-sacrifice in the 
service of a noble cause is the highest human calling (at least during one’s earthly life in this 
vale of tears).  !19
! To see this mixture of positive and negative eﬀects at work at the individual level, let 
us now turn to an actual historical case—Beethoven—one of Nietzsche’s prime examples of 
someone great (BGE, 256). Had Beethoven spent his life ministering to the needs of the 
 For this reading, see Reginster, The Aﬃrmation of Life (Harvard, 2006), p. 160-1.18
 As a matter of fact, one needn’t even be subtly swayed toward morality for it to be beneficial for greatness. 19
Even as something to fight against, “the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia” has proved important. 
For it has “created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit the like of which had never yet existed on 
earth: with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals” (BGE, “Preface”).18 Just consider the 
greatness of Nietzsche himself (and he, as his self-aggrandizing autobiography attests, is one of his favorite 
examples of someone great.) Would Nietzsche, the fulminator without equal, be half as interesting to read if he 
did not have Christianity or morality to spit upon? As he himself acknowledges, one needs a “profound 
appreciation of the value of having enemies...The church always wanted the destruction of its enemies; we, we 
immoralists and Antichristians, find our advantage in this, that the church exists” (TI, “Morality,” 3). Even if on 
some level morality is to the disadvantage of people like Nietzsche, it is also to their advantage. A central 
theme in Nietzsche’s work is how greatness can grow out of and thrive on agonal struggle, and he is arguably 
engaged in that sort of agonal struggle with the Judeo-Christian moral tradition in fighting so vigorously 
against its claim to primacy. For a discussion of the role of the agon in Nietzsche’s work, see Christa Davis 
Acampora, Contesting Nietzsche (University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
poor, or consumed with self-pity for his deafness, he would not have been able to produce 
the great works that he did. That is likely true. But had Beethoven not drawn subtly on a 
moral backdrop (in Nietzsche’s sense of “moral”) in producing his works, he would not have 
been able to produce the greatest works that he did.  That seems true as well. !
! Beethoven’s personal religious beliefs are a matter of some dispute; they seem to have 
been mistily spiritual and far from doctrinaire.  But Beethoven’s own beliefs aside, could he 20
have produced the Missa Solemnis, an undeniably religious work at least in subject matter, 
outside of a Christian cultural context? Or how about the middle movement of his sublime 
Op. 132, where Beethoven uses to wonderful eﬀect the Lydian mode, so reminiscent of 
medieval church music? The transcendent quality of this quartet, surely some of the most 
profound chamber music ever written, depends on the whole backdrop of religious 
associations that it draws upon.  While Beethoven’s own religious beliefs may be more 21
diﬃcult to pin down, his Enlightenment moral beliefs are inescapably clear. In the choral 
finale of his Symphony No. 9, Beethoven sets a text of deeply egalitarian moral sentiments 
to extraordinarily soul-stirring music. However grossly hypocritical he could sometimes be 
in his personal behavior, it is not as if Beethoven saw himself living by a wholly amoral 
credo. Far from it, in fact. In a letter of 1811, he goes so far as to say: “From my earliest 
childhood my zeal to serve our poor suﬀering humanity in any way whatsoever by means of 
my art has made no compromise with any lower motive.”  And indeed, how about 22
 See Maynard Solomon, Beethoven (Schirmer, 1977), p. 263-4. 20
 As the character Spandrell in Aldous Huxley’s novel Point Counter Point says of this movement, “‘It proves all 21
kinds of things–—God, the soul, goodness—unescapably. It’s the only real proof that exists; the only one, 
because Beethoven was the only man who could get his knowledge over into expression.’” (Chapter XXXVII) 
While it surely doesn’t “prove” anything of the sort, nor did Beethoven have “knowledge” of those things, that 
is an apt description of its spiritual aura. 
 Quoted in Solomon (1977), p. 3622
Beethoven’s persona of the tortured, suﬀering artist, living only for his art?  Is this mode of 23
life wholly unconnected with an undercurrent of Christian moral ideals about self-sacrifice 
and martyrdom in the service of a cause (even if the cause itself is diﬀerent)? Would such an 
arch-Romantic ideal have arisen without Christianity? At the level of direct and indirect 
influences, morality—and this, remember, includes Christianity—was as much a benefit to 
Beethoven’s greatness as a creative genius as it was a threat. !
! So too, we might say, when it comes to many of the peaks of culture, by Nietzsche’s 
lights. How exactly was morality bad for the musical artistry of Bach, Händel, and Heinrich 
Schütz, “Germans of the strong race” (EH, “Clever,” 7), composers Nietzsche very much 
admires, yet composers whose greatest works are suﬀused to the core with the Christian 
worldview and its ideals, and whose works, Nietzsche thinks, are indebted to it in more 
subtle ways as well?  And what is one to say of the Italian Renaissance? It certainly looms 24
preeminent in Nietzsche’s estimation (A, 61). But is the greatness of the Renaissance even 
thinkable without the Christian worldview that centrally informed it?!
!  We should not confuse this last question with another, related question of whether 
the Renaissance, or any other great creative flowering, in a person or a culture at large, 
would have been possible were there not also strong counter-forces to these Christian and 
more broadly moral ideals at the same time. For it is surely true that there were such 
 In Beethoven’s moving letter (usually referred to as the “Heiligenstadt Testament”) dated 6 October 1802 and 23
addressed to his brothers, he describes how he overcomes his suicidal despondency over his deafness: “But 
what mortification if someone stood beside me and heard a flute from afar and I heard nothing; or someone 
heard a shepherd singing, and I heard nothing. Such happenings brought me close to despair; I was not far 
from ending my own life–—only art, only art held me back. Ah, it seemed impossible to me that I should leave 
the world before I had produced all that I felt I might, and so I spared this wretched life...” in Pierro Weiss 
and Richard Taruskin (eds.), Music in the Western World: A History in Documents (Schirmer, 1984), p. 326-7.
 In KSA, 11:451 [1885], Nietzsche points out how in the hidebound form of counterpoint writing, Bach finds 24
his freedom as an artist. 
countervailing, noble, life-aﬃrming forces and that Nietzsche thinks they were essential (A, 
61). We can even go so far as to deny, as Nietzsche does in Twilight of the Idols, that the 
greatest figures of the Renaissance were even at core Christians. Nietzsche writes: “a 
Christian who would at the same time be an artist simply does not occur. One should not be 
childish and object by naming Raphael or some homeopathic Christian of the nineteenth 
centur y. Raphae l s a id Yes , Raphae l d i d Yes ; consequent l y, Raphae l wa s no 
Christian.” (Though perhaps Michelangelo would have been a much better example to 
illustrate Nietzsche’s point, since his flair for homoerotic depictions of rippled musculature 
is rather more deeply at odds with Christian morality. But we shall stick with Raphael.) Even 
supposing Nietzsche is right in his rather ambitiously revisionary claim that Raphael is not 
at core a Christian, does it follow that Christianity in the cultural background was not a 
beneficial precondition for Raphael’s being the great artist he was? Can we imagine the 
oeuvre of Raphael, stripped of the religious subject matter he draws upon in the Disposition, 
or the famous Madonna and Child, or the Transfiguration? Without these sorts of works, 
Raphael’s corpus would be seriously depleted. Indeed, the sense in which it would still even 
be Raphael’s corpus anymore under these circumstances is quite attenuated. Raphael came at 
a particular time in art history, in a particular cultural setting, faced with particular demands 
and particular artistic materials. His greatness consisted, in large part, in what he able to 
accomplish with—and despite—these. !
! This last point is a recurring theme in Nietzsche’s work—what one makes of what one is 
faced with. This is particularly important, according to Nietzsche, when one is faced with 
something that has the potential to be a serious danger. Consider what Nietzsche says about 
Wagner in Ecce Homo. After describing Wagner as at once both a “toxin” and an “antitoxin,” 
Nietzsche goes on to say: “...given the way I am, strong enough to turn even what is most 
questionable and dangerous to my advantage and thus to become stronger, I call Wagner the 
great benefactor of my life” (EH, “Clever,” 6). For those who are strong enough, that which 
is “questionable and dangerous” can also be what is most beneficial. So too with morality; 
this pharmakon, dare one say, may be a poison, but it is also a potion for creativity.  !25
! What, then, are we to make of Nietzsche’s idea that the strong run the risk of being 
“sickened” by the moral values of the herd (GM, III:14)? We might think this “sickness” of 
morality is bad for them, pure and simple, as cow’s milk is bad for human newborns.  But 26
this would be a drastic oversimplification of Nietzsche’s complex understanding of sickness. 
After all, when it comes to literal sickness, Nietzsche is far from thinking it need be a 
wholly bad thing for the person who is sick. Sickness can destroy people, to be sure. But it 
can also be a spur to greatness, so long as one is strong enough to turn the sickness to one’s 
advantage, as he stresses he was able to do in his own case: “In the midst of torments that go 
with an uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by a laborious vomiting of phlegm, 
I possessed a dialectician’s clarity par excellence and thought through with very cold blood 
matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not 
cold enough” (EH, “Wise,” 1). When it comes to more metaphorical forms of sickness, like 
the “infection” of a person by a system of values, we should, as I have been urging, not see 
this infection as needing to be wholly a bad thing either. For it may be partly out of his 
 There is a more general point in the background: “How much one is able to endure: distress, want, bad 25
weather, sickness, toil, solitude. Fundamentally one can cope with everything else, born as one is to a 
subterranean life of struggle; one emerges again and again into the light, one experiences again and again one’s 
golden hour of victory – and then one stands forth as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for new, even 
harder, remoter things, like a bow that distress only serves to make tauter” (GM, I:12).
 Leiter (2002), p. 106, applying to Nietzsche an example of Peter Railton’s from “Facts and Values,” 26
Philosophical Topics 14 (1986). 
sickness, both literal and metaphorical, that a person’s greatness flows, as was the case with 
many of the artists and intellectuals Nietzsche admires—himself included. (This is a point 
that Thomas Mann, in a gesture replete with Nietzschean undertones, makes quite 
dramatically in Doctor Faustus, where he has the central character, the composer Adrian 
Leverkühn, contract syphilis to deepen his creativity.) In short, we don’t do enough justice 
to morality when we say simply that it is a causal threat to the flourishing of greatness. Like 
a sickness, as Nietzsche understands it, it has both possible harms and benefits. !
! It might be conceded that perhaps in control led enough doses, or when 
counterbalanced by stronger life-aﬃrming forces, morality can be beneficial. But if a 
potentially great person becomes too taken with morality, then he will be stifled, his 
“conscience” will get “poison[ed]” (GM, III:14). Nietzsche, this argument will go, through his 
critique of morality wants to prevent this danger from taking hold. He is not, the revised 
claim will thus run, opposed to all contact with or influence from morality more generally 
on the part of the nascently great. !
! Nietzsche does say we should “protect the well-constituted from the worst kind of 
air, the air of the sickroom” (GM, III:14). But this exhortation, we should notice, is in 
tension with other views he holds. Take Nietzsche’s conviction, the leitmotif of Ecce Homo, 
that a truly great person will be able to turn questionable and dangerous things to his 
advantage. “A typically morbid being cannot become healthy...For a typically healthy person, 
conversely, being sick can even become an energetic stimulus to life, for living more” (EH, 
“Wise,” 2). This is because the “well-turned out person,” as he says, has “a taste only for what 
is good for him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure of what is good for him is 
transgressed. He guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad 
accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger” (EH, “Wise,” 2).  27
Goethe, Beethoven, and Raphael (if Nietzsche is right about him) didn’t need Nietzsche 
enlightening them with the exhortation to be life-aﬃrming or with warnings not to 
underestimate the importance of suﬀering to great achievement; they did so by themselves, 
“exploit[ing] bad accidents to [their] advantage,” because that is what great people do. Perhaps 
Nietzsche just sees himself as making explicit what was already implicit for these towering 
figures. Yet it remains puzzling why he is so worried about protecting the great individual 
from the “sickroom air” of morality, when he himself appears to deny that this bad air would 
ever pose a decisive threat to the the flourishing of the genuinely great individual at all. Such 
people’s constitutions and attitudes toward life prevent moral infections from being 
debilitating, since if they are truly great, they will be able (or will have been able) to turn 
“the questionable and dangerous” to their advantage. !28
! We are left with an apparent dilemma: Either morality’s eﬀect on a person can be 
powerful enough to “stifle” or “crush” that person, thereby undermining his potential for 
greatness, or it cannot be powerful enough. If morality is powerful enough, then the person 
in question will not be able to be a Nietzschean great individual anyway, since he is unable to 
turn the “questionable and dangerous” to his advantage, as Nietzsche thinks is criterial of 
being a great person. If, on the other hand, morality is not powerful enough to stifle the 
person, then morality turned out not to be a debilitating threat after all. He flourished 
despite it; what didn’t “kill” him made him stronger (EH, “Wise,” 2). Either way, morality 
 Nietzsche’s point here becomes more plausible if he means “kill” [umbringt] in a looser sense, extending 27
beyond literal death. 
 What Nietzsche says about falling victim to pessimism presumably holds true of other moral “sicknesses” as 28
well: “One falls victim to it as one falls victim to cholera: one has to be morbid enough in one’s whole 
predisposition. Pessimism itself does not create a single decadent more” (TI, “Skirmishes,” 36).
would not seem to be a decisive threat in terms of its causal consequences on the flourishing 
of greatness. !
! Now this is of course in tension with Nietzsche’s repeated suggestions that morality 
has had and will have bad eﬀects (e.g., “an irreplaceable amount of strength and spirit” is 
“crushed, stifled and ruined,” (BGE, 188), Cf., GM, I:12; A, 5). Perhaps the resolution is that 
morality has stifled many who, while strong, capable and intelligent far beyond the mass of 
mankind, were not up to the challenge of facing it and turning it to their advantage. 
Nietzsche, I suspect, is thinking of Pascal in this regard, when he calls him “the most 
instructive victim of Christianity” (EH, “Clever,” 3; Cf., A, 5). But it would seem that the 
best Nietzschean conclusion is not the one he himself draws in GM, III:14, of the following 
form: Morality threatens to undo the great by stifling them; so let us protect them from 
morality so that they have an easier time of things. It is instead: If morality is successful at 
stifling a person, then ipso facto he is not great. Before there was Nietzsche, and his critique of 
morality, there were, by his own lights, great individuals, who managed quite well without 
him, because they made do ably with what they were faced with, whether it be Christianity 
or some other branch of the morality family. If they did not need his help when morality was 
an even stronger cultural force, why should they need it even more as morality weakens its 
social grip in the late 19th century? At the very least, this is an interpretive puzzle, 
representative of a serious tension in Nietzsche’s work.!
!  None of this is to deny that Nietzsche thinks that living in accord with morality (or 
more subtly, inhaling its vapors from the cultural surroundings) can have—and has had—
many bad eﬀects on human creativity and greatness. Nietzsche makes this abundantly clear 
in so many places in his work (e.g., TI, “Skirmishes,” 38; A, 7, 11 and many others). But, by 
the same token, morality, as we have just seen can have and has had many good eﬀects on 
human creativity and greatness too, eﬀects that Nietzsche himself recognizes and 
celebrates. Both blame and praise can be laid at morality’s door in this respect. Of course, 
just because morality has some good eﬀects, we cannot reject the possibility that 
Nietzsche’s main objection to morality is still grounded in its bad eﬀects, since the bad 
eﬀects might outweigh the good ones. But even when it comes to the eﬀects of morality on 
the elite cadre of Nietzschean higher types or potential higher types—and the key claim of 
theEﬀects Interpretation is that this is where morality will be seriously deleterious—
Nietzsche himself appears deeply conflicted: Sometimes he claims that morality poses a 
serious danger for the flourishing of greatness, other times he claims that morality cannot be 
a danger for the flourishing of greatness, since part of being or becoming great is to turn 
what could otherwise be dangerous to one’s advantage. Most importantly, though, the 
Eﬀects Interpretation suggests an odd sort of commitment on Nietzsche’s part. It can make 
it seem as though, as far as the Nietzschean values of perfectionism are concerned, things 
would have been better oﬀ had morality not arisen. But that, as I have suggested, is far from 
clear. Nietzsche describes again and again how as the result of morality we have become 
corrupted, sick, and decadent. But then again, it is thanks to morality that we have raised 
ourselves above the rest of the animals, acquired depth and become interesting (GM, I:6). 
Would he have us give that up and return to the state of the marauding nobles described in 
the First Essay of the Genealogy? This reversion to the past is not possible (TI, “Skirmishes,” 
43), nor is it desirable (GS, 377). !
! As I say, these objections are not meant to be decisive. And it is nearly indisputable 
that Nietzsche thinks morality has bad eﬀects. But given these interpretative challenges, it 
would be helpful to find some alternative Nietzschean foothold for his critique of morality, 
one that does pin his charges against morality solely or even primarily on morality’s bad 
eﬀects. And as I shall suggest in the section to follow, there is just such a foothold: We can 
interpret Nietzsche’s critique as less about what the institution of morality causes and more 
about what it expresses . He has room to object to the character of moral values 
independently of the mixed bag of eﬀects they engender. This allows Nietzsche to 
acknowledge that morality’s eﬀects on the realization of perfectionistic values have basically 
been mixed, but still to hold that morality is thoroughly objectionable even despite this. In the 
section to follow, I will sketch the space for this alternative and oﬀer textual evidence that 
supports the idea that these are among the considerations that Nietzsche appeals to. !
!
IV. The Notion of Expressive Character and the Expressive Character of Morality!
! Nietzsche, in addition to charting morality’s eﬀects, both positive and negative, is, I 
will suggest, giving a “reading” of morality, as one might give an interpretation of a work of 
art.  Just as one might read a work of art with an eye toward extracting the worldview 29
enshrined or expressed in it, Nietzsche is looking to give a reading of various aspects of 
morality as an historical human institution by interpreting its features so as to draw out 
what he takes them to represent. And just as one might object to the ideals, values, and 
attitudes that one’s interpretation takes to be in an art work—the misogyny or the anti-
Semitism, for example—Nietzsche is objecting to the ideals, values, and attitudes that, on 
his interpretation, are to be found in morality and its attendant phenomena. He is objecting 
 These analogies between Nietzschean philosophy and literature are a central feature of Nehamas’s account 29
(1985). He sees interpretation as a pervasive element in Nietzsche’s philosophical practice. 
not just to the eﬀects of morality, but to the expressive character of the institution of 
morality itself.!
! Although this style of criticism finds particular purchase in criticizing works of art, it 
would be very misleading thereby to cast it as an aesthetic objection. After all, the grounds on 
which one is objecting are not distinctively aesthetic grounds having to do with distinctively 
aesthetic failings, e.g., that the work is ugly, or disordered, or something of that sort. Rather, 
the grounds for the objection have to do with more broadly ethical failings. When, for 
example, Adorno objects to the authoritarianism that he (of course, very controversially) 
alleges is in the music of Stravinsky, it is not a purely aesthetic objection; he is finding this 
music objectionable on ethical and political grounds. But importantly, his charge is not 
grounded in a causal sociological claim that this music leads to authoritarianism. Nor is his 
claim the intentionalist one that Stravinsky deliberately crafted his music to give voice to 
this ideology. It is rather that, in its immanent musical materials, it is expressive of 
authoritarianism and is problematic on this account. !
! To get a grip on the structure of the objection, compare the case of pornography and 
the criticism one might level against it.  One could take it to task for its troubling eﬀects. 30
As some have argued, pornography incites men to rape women. But suppose that its eﬀects, 
on balance, turned out to be quite mixed, maybe even beneficial; perhaps empirical 
investigation shows that it actually deters crimes against women by giving men with certain 
violent sexual fantasies an alternative outlet. Still, one could object to pornography for the 
values one takes it to enshrine. Such criticism would be in principle independent of what 
eﬀects one takes pornography to have. And of course, if pornography turns out to have bad 
 My thanks to __________ for suggesting this point of analogy. 30
eﬀects on balance too, as it may well (especially if one moves beyond a focus on rape and 
considers the other deleterious downstream eﬀects of the objectifying attitudes toward 
women that it fosters), one then has an additional ground for objecting to it. This ground is 
about what problematic attitudes and ideals one takes pornography itself to be expressive 
of. It would be strange, and it would grotesquely understate the ethical import of such a 
charge, to think it is an aesthetic objection to pornography. It is rightly an ethical charge, 
but just not one rooted in a causal sociological claim about its eﬀects. !
! Or to move away from anything remotely art-like having to do with the mimetic at 
all, consider the example I mentioned in the introduction: the charges one might level 
against segregationist ideologies and practices, of the sort associated with the Jim Crow 
laws. These without a doubt have tremendously bad eﬀects on the overall flourishing of 
those stigmatized by them, by hampering their equal access to educational and other social 
goods and by undermining their self-respect and self-worth by making them out to be 
second-class citizens. But they are also objectionable because they (i.e., the laws and the 
social institutions and practices in which they are imbedded) express a certain oﬀensive idea 
about racial superiority and inferiority. In addition to objecting to their bad eﬀects, we can 
object to this too. !
! I oﬀer these prefatory remarks as a first pass for characterizing a certain kind of 
critical strategy. For it is this style of broadly ethical criticism that we see in much of 
Nietzsche’s criticism of morality. I have chosen these morally-aware examples deliberately as 
a way of setting things up. Nietzsche himself often betrays a shocking degree of misogyny, 
and he thinks the equal worth and dignity of all was a sham fostered by Christianity and 
later perpetuated by the morality system. Even if we do not share in these views of his (and 
unlike in the examples I just gave, there will be a greater divergence between the views of 
critic and audience, in the case of Nietzsche’s criticism of morality), the style of criticism he 
is leveling can be appropriated for ethical and political ends that we find more congenial. Yet 
rather than trying any further to describe in this abstract way what he is doing, let us look to 
some textual evidence and build our account from there. !
! Take, for example, his interpretation of the Christian concept of God. He frames the 
issue by suggesting the contrast between the pagan gods and the Christian God in terms of 
what they represent. He writes: “when everything strong, brave, masterful, and proud is 
eliminated from conceptions of God [Gottesbegriﬀe], when he degenerates step by step into a 
mere symbol, a staﬀ for the weary, a sheet-anchor for the drowning, when he becomes the 
god of the poor, the sinners, and the sick par excellence...what does such a transformation 
bespeak?” [wovon redet eine solche Verwandlung] (A, 17). Here the issue is not so much what 
eﬀects this view of God causes, but what values this conception of God, in the abstract, 
enshrines. And against such values, Nietzsche delivers a stinging verdict in the passage that 
follows: “The Christian conception of God—God as the god of the sick, God as a spider, 
God as spirit—is one of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on earth.  31
It may even represent the low-water mark in the descending development of divine types. 
God degenerated into the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal 
Yes!” (A, 18). The flaccid and impoverished values represented in this conception of the 
divine are not Nietzschean ones of strength, bravery, mastery, pride—as, he supposes, might 
 Nietzsche continues, describing the intellectualist God that comes to prominence in early modern 31
philosophy: “Even the palest of the pale were able to master [this God]: our honorable metaphysicians, those 
concept-albinos. They spun their webs around him until, hypnotized by their motions, he himself became a 
spider, another metaphysician. Now he, in turn, spun the world out of himself–—sub specie Spinozae. Now he 
transfigured himself into something ever thinner and paler; he became an ‘ideal,’ he became ‘pure spirit,’ the 
‘Absolute,’ the ‘thing-in-itself.’ The deterioration of a god: God became the ‘thing-in-itself.’” (A, 17)
be exemplified in a life-aﬃrming pagan deity. As we shall see, Nietzsche’s construals of 
various moral ideals and institutions are typically leveled in this tendentious register. I don’t 
seek to vindicate his interpretation and criticism as correct, or to adduce considerations for 
and against, but instead to make clear the critical manner in which he often proceeds. (In 
the section to follow (V), I say more about what I think the philosophical import of this 
style of criticism is, and how I think it might have a claim on the attention of Nietzsche’s 
audience.) !
! He levels structurally similar charges against the conceptions of well-being that he 
regards as debased. Describing the reaction of his ideal person of “warrior” virtue, he writes: 
“The human being who has become free—and how much more the spirit who has become free—
wipes his feet [mit Füßen treten]  with the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by 32
shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats” (TI, “Skirmishes, 
38). He of course mentions various people drawn to such a view of well-being, but notice 
that in the first instance it is this idea of well-being that is itself the explicit object of 
contempt. The ideal enshrines as supreme what is in Nietzsche’s view a sort of well-being 
befitting cows—hence the mention of them in the list—a longing for the “green-pasture 
happiness of the herd” (BGE, 44) where human well-being is reckoned by the calculus of 
pleasure and pain. Guiding one’s life by this vulgar ideal has the potential to lead to harmful 
(BGE, 225) and to beneficial eﬀects (BGE, 61) . But there is room to object to it 
independently of these eﬀects, and that is a line of attack that Nietzsche here exploits. !
 This is Nietzsche’s play on words: This phrase literally means to “tread on with [one’s] feet.” This could 32
therefore mean something like “trample underfoot,” but more metaphorically it means to “regard with 
contempt.” I here adopt Judith Norman’s nice translation that captures a bit of both senses.  
! Or take the example of ascetic ideals, the subject of the Third Essay of the Genealogy. 
Here Nietzsche makes his hermeneutically-minded approach very clear.  The issue for him 33
is not simply about what eﬀects ascetic ideals have had. For he begins the Third Essay with 
a question asking not what ascetic ideals have caused, but asking instead, “[w]hat do ascetic 
ideals mean?” [Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?] (GM, III: 1). He is not, to be sure, asking what 
they “mean” in the sense of asking what their definition is; it is a much broader notion of 
“meaning”—that is, what they stand for, signal, reflect.  He notes that they are a complex 
palimpsest. But out of this, Nietzsche distills what he takes ascetic ideals at core to 
enshrine: “[a] hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the 
material, [a] horror of the senses, of reason itself, [a] fear of happiness and beauty, [a] 
longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing 
itself ” (GM, III:28). As Nietzsche goes on to spell out in the course of the Third Essay, 
ascetic ideals have had a range of eﬀects both good and bad. They have poisoned humanity, 
infecting them with a hatred of life and of this-worldly things (GM, III:14). But they have 
also staved oﬀ death and nihilism by giving humans a goal to strive for, even if they are 
striving for something hollow (GM, III:13, 28). And ascetic ideals ultimately lead to the 
“self-overcoming” of morality (GM, III:27), partly in the person of Nietzsche himself, since 
they are the kernel of his relentless honesty in facing the truth that many have been too 
timid to face. But apart from these mixed eﬀects, ascetic ideals exude a worldview that 
Nietzsche regards as perverse and repugnant. !
! Nietzsche describes Christianity as animated by a similar sort of attitude, setting 
itself against worldly things with gusto. In his “Attempt at Self-Criticism,” appended as an 
 As stressed by Nehamas (1985), esp. Chs. 4 and 7 and Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, (Blackwell, 33
1991), p. 84. 
Introduction to The Birth of Tragedy in 1886 (the year in which he published Beyond Good and 
Evil and was writing On The Genealogy of Morals), he writes: !
! !
From the very outset Christianity was essentially and pervasively the feeling of 
disgust and weariness which life felt for life, a feeling which merely disguised, hid and 
decked itself out in its belief in “another” or “better” life. Hatred of the “world,” a 
curse on the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a Beyond, invented in order 
better to defame the Here-and-Now, fundamentally a desire for nothingness, for the 
end, for rest, for the “Sabbath of Sabbaths” (BT, “Attempt,” 5).!
!
No doubt he is probably thinking of this attitude as manifested by particular Christians. But 
notice the way he couches things: it is a feature of Christianity writ large. !
! Often, though, the line between criticism of the worldview itself and criticism of its 
proponents blurs, and it is very diﬃcult to tell whether Nietzsche is objecting to the values 
and institutions in the abstract or to the deficient character of the people who accept such 
views, or to both. Frequently it would appear to be both. Consider what Nietzsche says 
about the Christian ideal of immortality in The Antichrist: !
!
That everyone as an “immortal soul” has equal rank with everyone else, that in the 
totality of living beings the “salvation” of every single individual may claim eternal 
significance, that little gnats [Mucker] and three-quarter-madmen may have the 
conceit that the laws of nature are constantly broken for their sakes–such an 
intensification of every kind of selfishness into the infinite, into the impertinent, 
cannot be branded with too much contempt. And yet Christianity owes its triumph 
to this miserable flattery of personal vanity: it was precisely all the failures, all the 
rebellious-minded, all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse of humanity who 
were thus won over to it. The “salvation of the soul”–in plain language: “the world 
revolves around me” (A, 43).!
!
! The ideal is itself objectionable. It is so because it, for example, enshrines “the equal 
rank” of everyone, an idea that Nietzsche views as not simply false but as debasing; making 
rank so easy to come by devalues it into something no longer worth anything, like the status 
of “vice-president” in those companies where there are thousands holding this title. And 
moreover the people who accept this ideal are objectionable for their narcissistic vanity (the 
irony of which Nietzsche revels in, given the Christian celebration of humility and 
condemnation of pride) and objectionable especially for the fact that this overweening self-
regard far exceeds what their actual characteristics warrant.   “[A]ll the failures, all the 34
rebellious-minded, all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse of humanity” help 
themselves to a form of undeserved self-regard. Notice how Nietzsche draws attention to the 
hermeneutic dimension of what he is doing by suggesting that he is rendering in “plain 
language” what was concealed in the conventional Christian understanding of things. 
Nietzsche trades what he regards as an inaccurate or incomplete interpretation—“‘the 
salvation of the soul’”—with another one—“‘the world revolves around me.’” Now Nietzsche 
is of course noting an important eﬀect here. People are “thus won over” to these Christian 
 It should be noted obvious that Nietzsche has nothing against proud self-regard where that is warranted. 34
The noble soul, as he says, “has reverence for itself ” (BGE, 287)–, and fittingly so.
ideals, he says. But his charge just as much appears to be against the ideal itself and against 
the people drawn to it, as it is to this eﬀect or to further downstream eﬀects. !
! Consider, similarly, the passage from the Summa Theologiae that Nietzsche takes great 
relish in citing in the Genealogy (I:15).  Here Aquinas claims that the bliss of the saints in 35
heaven is made all the better by being able to watch the torments of the damned down in 
hell. Whatever self-interpretation Christians may have of their hell as representing the 
triumph of “justice,” Nietzsche puts a diﬀerent spin on it—and on them. As he reads the 
notion of “hell,” it is representative of a kind of vicious glee, of a sort that they are not 
honest with themselves about.  Rather than Dante’s inscription over hell—“I too was 36
created by eternal love”—Nietzsche says that “I too was created by eternal hate” would 
better capture the spirit of this heaven with an observation deck (GM, I:15). !
! The strategy of argument is even more vivid in the previous section of the Genealogy 
where Nietzsche imagines a character, Mr. Rash and Curious, descending into the “dark 
workshop” where ideals are manufactured. A sort of transformation is going on, this 
character reports back to Nietzsche, an attempt to make “whiteness, milk, and innocence of 
every blackness” (GM, I:14).  The creators of morality are trying to carry oﬀ this 
transformation, so as to conceal what their ideals really are. Nietzsche here draws an analogy 
to art; he tells Mr. Rash and Curious to be attentive to “the most ingenious, most 
mendacious artistic stroke” of these “cellar rodents full of vengefulness and hatred” (GM, I:
14) who seek to apply a concealing layer of prettifying paint to their ideals. Again, the aim 
 III, Supplementum, Q.94, Art. 135
 This pleasure in cruelty is not just true of Christianity, he thinks, but is a pervasive feature of many human 36
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here is to scrape oﬀ the layer of paint and to make manifest what is actually extolled by 
these ideals—here weakness and cowardice, marketing themselves under more appealing 
names. !
! Once could go through many more passages just like these. Kantianism, along with 
Platonism, enshrines a longing for a beyond—the “true world” behind this world (Cf., TI, 
“True World”). Democracy enshrines a hostility to rank, it “represents the disbelief in great 
human beings and an elite society” (WP, 752; KSA, 11:224). Its animating idea is that we are 
“‘one and all self-seeking [eigennütziges] cattle and mob’” (WP, 752; KSA, 11:224). The 
unconstrained “will to truth,” in longing for communion with The Truth as a kind of ersatz 
beatific vision, “aﬃrms another world than that of life, nature, and history” (GM, III:25). The 
French revolution is the “world historical expression” of the “duality of idealist and rabble,” 
that Nietzsche thinks is personified in Rousseau, “this first modern man...sick with 
unbridled vanity and unbridled self-contempt” (TI, “Skirmishes,” 48). Nietzsche’s concern, I 
have tried to argue, is not here with morality’s bad eﬀects only. It is also with what is 
enshrined and expressed in morality. !
! Morality’s expressive character diverges from what by Nietzsche’s lights are the true 
values. But there are various ways of diverging from the truth, when it comes to values. 
Mere falsity is not the problem here. What’s distinctive is that these are downright 
perversions of the real values by Nietzsche’s lights: Instead of this world and life, they 
celebrate a beyond and another life. Instead of expressing strength, they express weakness. 
Cowardice in place of bravery. Humility in place of pride. Baseness instead of nobility. 
Equality instead of hierarchy. Bovine comfort instead of heroic striving. Self-deception 
instead of honesty. Elimination of the self instead of the artistic cultivation of the self. And 
so on. It’s not just that they valorize the wrong things. They valorize either the opposite of the 
right things. Or else they get on to the right things, but in some grotesquely perverse 
extreme: healthy self-regard becomes cosmic narcissism; healthy self-mastery becomes self-
tyranny, beneficial pruning of drives becomes a tyrannical obsession with extirpation, 
repression, castration of the drives entirely, the ability to take sustenance in beneficial 
illusions collapses into a life whose highest ideals are utter delusions. Morality’s evaluative 
compass is seriously out of whack, when it comes to tracking the values. It’s not just that the 
needle is broken or wildly erratic. It’s that it systematically points to the anti-values. !
! In the “Preface” to the Genealogy, Nietzsche asks: Have moral values “hitherto 
hindered or furthered human flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of 
the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plentitude, force, 
and will of life, its courage, certainty, future” (GM, “Preface,” 3). He might be read here as 
raising a question simply about the eﬀects of morality on the flourishing of humanity. But 
notice what he literally says. He asks, in addition, what the values themselves are a “sign” of. 
He asks what is “revealed” in them. There are two objects of study here: the eﬀects of the 
values on human flourishing (quite mixed, as we have seen) and the values themselves as 
meaning-bearing entities to be interpreted. I have suggested that this act of interpretation, 
carried out in the Genealogy and in Nietzsche’s other main texts, seeks, among other things 
to reveal and to criticize the expressive character of these values themselves. !
!
V. Conclusion!
! Now to conclude: On the central exegetical question, I’ve tried to show that the 
Eﬀects Interpretation has several diﬃculties, and further, I’ve tried to show that it can’t 
make good sense of the extent of Nietzsche’s criticism of morality. This criticism is 
considerably more thoroughgoing than the Eﬀects Interpretation allows. Even if morality’s 
eﬀects were, by Nietzsche’s lights, uniformly beneficial (as of course they are not), he would 
still, on my reading, have complaints to voice. I’ve presented an alternative that seeks to 
capture this other strong strand we see in Nietzsche’s work, the strand focused on the 
expressive character of the institution of morality.!
! But what are we to make, philosophically, of all these construals of Nietzsche’s, 
where he is alleging to uncover the expressive character of various moral phenomena? After 
all, we might interpret the institution of morality very diﬀerently from the way that 
Nietzsche does. We could see morality as expressing love and concern for others. We could 
see it as expressing hope for a better and truly more just world. We might, more generally, be 
concerned that the expressive character of the ideals, symbols, and practices of morality is 
simply too murky and subject to controversy to bear any philosophical and critical weight. 
That is a serious worry, and not one that can be fully allayed. But I would say that we 
shouldn’t see his controversial interpretations as aspiring to be the comprehensive truth. 
Interpretations, he would be the first to admit, are partial, in both senses of that word. His 
gripping, sometimes inflammatory interpretations often involve deliberate hyperbole on his 
part, bringing out, though selective emphasis, one aspect of complex phenomena, leaving 
other aspects to recede from view. !
! With some of his interpretations anyway, we might find them convincing and 
disagree at a diﬀerent stage. We might thus go along with him and see morality as 
expressing, for example, the dignity and equality of all—but think, very naturally, that this is a 
good thing. The disagreement comes in the underlying values we hold. Nietzsche’s criticism, 
it might be thought, is hereby faced with what has been posed as an “authority” problem:  37
How can Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality have force, unless we share his background value 
commitments? Do his complaints, insofar as they fail to resonate with our antecedent 
commitments, simply fall on deaf ears? !
! There are undeniably diﬃcult issues here, which I cannot treat adequately. But I 
think, as a start, we must keep separate a descriptive issue (will anyone’s mind be changed by 
Nietzsche’s critique? And if so, whose minds and why?) with a genuinely normative one (do 
Nietzschean considerations, on his view, warrant anyone changing her mind, putting 
normative pressure on her to do so?). In assessing how (or whether) the latter question is 
even apposite when it comes to Nietzsche, we quickly begin to get into issues of his meta-
ethics and meta-axiology—specifically, does Nietzsche think that his own preferred values 
have any potential claim to accuracy over the value claims of Judeo-Christian morality? Is he 
taking himself to be getting something right (at least to be getting closer to the truth), in 
contrast to others who are getting things wrong? Or is it just a bare clash of preferences, 
none with any claim to authority? !
! My own view is that the reports of Nietzsche’s blanket axiological skepticism are 
greatly exaggerated. And similarly I wonder whether the internalist constraint sometimes 
attributed to Nietzsche—that a value must be in anchored in the commitments of my 
evaluative perspective to have normative authority over me—is one that Nietzsche really 
himself accepts, given his criticism of certain evaluative perspectives as downright erroneous 
(A, 9). Can something truly be a value (especially a value for me), regardless of my particular 
attitudes toward it and regardless of my commitments being in tension with it? I don’t think 
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he means to deny this. But these are matters I take up elsewhere.  Whether—and if so, to 38
what extent—Nietzsche’s criticisms will have genuine normative authority for others will 
depend on where one stands on these issues in the background. !
! Yet these tricky meta-axiological matters aside, there is definitely a puzzle about why 
Nietzsche proceeds philosophically in the way that he does. What is he seeking to 
accomplish? It is clearly more than just to relate facts in a dispassionate manner. His goal is 
to change (at least some) hearts and minds, and if he is to accomplish that goal, he must take 
into account what his audience is going to find persuasive (both intellectually and 
rhetorically). One reason he puts such an emphasis on the mendacity inherent in morality 
(e.g., GM I:14), for example, is that he realizes that morality, and its adherents, also highly 
prize a commitment to truthfulness and that this will be a compelling consideration for 
them.  With truthfulness, it is more apparent that Nietzsche and his central opponents are 39
on common axiological ground. But how about when it comes to pride, rank-ordering, 
domination, strength, bravery, bodily sensuality, even ruthlessness? In complaining that the 
Judeo-Christian tradition and what follows in its wake don’t express these values, and 
express competing values instead, does Nietzsche have a criticism that will have any sway 
over his opponents? Part of what Nietzsche is up to, in presenting these Nietzschean values 
in a vivid and appealing way, is to remind us just how much these values can and do still 
resonate with us, and to remind us how they have gotten short shrift in the moral tradition. !
! When it comes to the values that Nietzsche is criticizing—selflessness, humility, pity, 
equality—and the institutions and practices that manifest these ideals, I don’t think he is 
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trying to engineer wholesale rejection of them (even by Nietzschean higher types.) His 
fulminations are often an exercise in provocation, meant to shake up our complacent 
attitudes and get us to reevaluate our commitments, instead of making us abandon all of 
these commitments entirely. Part of what he is trying to encourage is more ambivalence to 
these values, and the institutions that realize them, than we might otherwise have. It is not 
just (or mainly) a matter of getting us to alter how we act, though surely Nietzsche wanted 
to change that on some level. He is as interested, if not more so, in engaging and thereby 
changing our attitudes and our aﬀects.  “We have to learn to think diﬀerently— in order at 40
last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel diﬀerently” (D, 103). And Nietzsche, on 
my view, is trying to get us to change our feelings not simply because diﬀerent, more 
Nietzschean attitudes will have better downstream eﬀects, but because our attitudes are 
presently out of line with what the objects of these attitudes warrant. Do humility and 
equality deserve as much admiration as we give them? And do domination and power 
deserve as little? I see Nietzsche as trying to readjust things on this front. !
! From his first book The Birth of Tragedy to his final works of 1888, Nietzsche set his 
course as a social and cultural critic, concerned with diagnosing and countering what he 
perceived to be the decadence of Western civilization. This guiding concern and project of 
Nietzsche’s, and the strategies that he mobilizes in support of it, can be diﬃcult to 
assimilate into the ways of doing philosophy that are acceptable in most philosophical 
circles today. Where we expect arguments, he gives impassioned interpretations and re-
interpretations. Where we expect a full-blown theory, we get isolated bons mots. Where we 
expect a measured tone, he goes in for extremes. And not all of this is the fault simply of 
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incautious excess, but some of it is bound up with the distinctive philosophical project that 
Nietzsche is seeking to undertake.!
! Yet, even accounting for this, if we think Nietzsche’s objections to morality are still 
too one-sided and overwrought to take on board as the full truth, as we no doubt on some 
level should, I do think the style of broadly ethical and ideological criticism in evidence in 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality is worth thinking about much more. We are accustomed to 
assessing the permissibility of discrete actions, judging outcomes of actions as beneficial or 
harmful, assessing individual traits of character, and the like. This all clearly falls within the 
purview of ethics and moral psychology. But Nietzsche, interestingly, directs attention to 
the character of suprapersonal entities too—the phenomena of the socio-historical institution 
of morality most notably—and he renders an ethical verdict on them. It is in this respect 
that his approach is most strikingly modern, prefiguring and perhaps influencing the sort of 
social criticism that would become a staple in various strands of 20th century continental 
philosophy and cultural criticism. Nietzsche is exploiting an important logical space in 
leveling ethical or evaluative charges that criticize not just individuals but also broader 
practices and institutions too. And that criticize these institutions not just on account of 
their eﬀects, but on account of their expressive character as well. His mode of critique is 
something we need to account for, and make more use of, in contemporary social, ethical, 
and political philosophy, if not to further Nietzsche’s own values exactly, then to further 
whatever admixture of Nietzschean values and Judeo-Christian moral values better 
approximates the truth about things, if indeed there is one.   41
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